State and Local Government Review ing of local revenue sources leads to an increase in the level and share of spending in a designated category (in this case, capital spending). The characteristics of SPLOST in Georgia are briefly described, and data and research methodology are then discussed. The findings have both theoretical and policy implications for local earmarking practice.
I
N RECENT YEARS, the public has begun to perceive the importance of improved public capital facilities for local economic development, business retention, and quality of life in communities. This public interest has prompted concerns among local government officials regarding adequate public capital investment and maintenance efforts. Major capital outlay sources for local governments have been intergovernmental grants (federal and state) and own-source revenues (current revenues and long-term borrowing). The sources of capital outlay in local and state governments have fluctuated in importance over the years. Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, federal aid was the major source, peaking at over 40 cents out of every dollar spent on local and state infrastructure (Petersen, Holstein, and Weiss 1993) . However, the termination of federal revenue sharing, reduced federal grants, and various spending and tax limitations imposed by the state government and voters in the wake of taxpayer revolts since the late 1970s have made it more difficult for local officials to find adequate revenue sources for capital projects. Faced with declining federal and state aid and resistance to property taxes, local governments have increasingly relied on user charges and fees, as well as a host of innovative financing
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Unfortunately, the revenue size of these benefit-based revenue sources has been neither sufficient nor stable enough to meet the growing needs of local capital projects. Some states have permitted localities to use a portion of local income, sales, or excise taxeswhich are more stable and significant revenue sources-to finance local infrastructure. Georgia became one of the first states to allow counties to earmark funds to finance local capital projects by introducing a 1 percent special purpose local option sales tax (SPLOST) in 1985. 1 The practice of earmarking is prevalent across different levels of government despite ongoing normative debates about the strengths and weaknesses of earmarking strategy on budgetary consequences (Eklund 1972; Perez and Snell 1995) .
Results of empirical studies of the fiscal impact of specific earmarked revenues on a designated category of expenditures are mixed and inconclusive.
2 Most studies have examined earmarking at either the national or state level; few have investigated the impact of local earmarking at the level of a designated category of spending. Georgia's SPLOST provides a case for testing whether the earmark-
SPLOST in Georgia
In 1985, at the request of local elected officials, the Georgia General Assembly allowed its local governments to impose a 1 percent SPLOST to finance the growing need for local capital projects. The tax is imposed on the purchase, sale, rental, storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property and related services. To utilize the tax, a countywide referendum must be passed, with proposed projects listed on the ballot. Once the referendum is passed, the tax can be collected for up to five years or until a designated maximum amount is collected, whichever comes first. The tax can be renewed with the passage of another referendum. The proceeds are to be used for projects within and outside the county, or both within and outside municipalities. The tax proceeds can be used for a limited set of local capital (i.e., nonoperating) projects, such as roads, streets, courthouses, administrative buildings, civic centers, hospitals, jails, correctional facilities, public safety facilities, airport facilities, solid waste facilities, water and sewer projects, cultural and recreational facilities, and other capital projects (Clements and Weeks 1997, 5-7) .
Since SPLOST was authorized, a growing number of counties have utilized the tax. In the first year (1985) , only 12 counties utilized the tax among 159 Georgia counties. The number increased to 81 in 1988, 92 in 1990, and 124 in 1995. As of January 1999, 130 counties were collecting the sales tax (Georgia Department of Revenue 1999).
3 Thus, next to property taxes and the 1 percent local option sales tax (LOST), 4 which is used to provide property tax relief, SPLOST is the third largest revenue source for most Georgia county governments.
Previous Research
Studies examining whether earmarked revenue actually increases spending for its intended purpose are equivocal. A key issue is the fungibility of funds-that is, whether the earmarked revenue is used as a substitute for other sources of revenue. Deran (1965) utilized survey data on the earmarking of state taxes and found no bivariate association between earmarking as a share of expenditures and expenditures per capita. After examining expenditures in developing countries, Eklund found that "earmarking is associated with a higher relative expenditure allocation to the earmarking function than when there is no earmarking" (1972, 224) . Borg and Mason (1988) analyzed lottery revenues in Illinois and found that the increase in lottery revenues for school aid was matched by a decline in appropriated general fund revenues, and school aid actually decreased after the lottery began.
Two multistate lottery studies yielded similar results. Examining time series data in seven lottery states that earmarked lottery revenue to state education spending, Spindler (1995) found that the education spending ratio (state education spending : state general revenue fund) tended to decline once a lottery was introduced following the adoption of the lottery. By employing pooled time-series data in 50 states from 1966 to 1990 , Miller and Pierce (1997 found that education spending increased in nonlottery states compared with lottery states. Although per capita spending did not decrease, the rate of growth in education spending declined in the years following the initial use of the lottery. These studies suggest that although the lottery can be promoted as a means to increase funding for education, lottery revenues actually serve as substitutes for general fund expenditure (that is, they are fungible). Dye and McGuire (1992) examined 1984 and 1988 surveys conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures and found that an extra dollar of earmarked revenue results in either no change in expenditures or in-creases in spending that are much less than a dollar. Specifically, the authors asked whether an extra dollar of revenue earmarked for a particular purpose (i.e., education, highways, and aid to local governments) increased spending for the designated category in 44 states and whether the total aggregated earmarked revenue increased the level of total spending. When an extra dollar was dedicated to highways, earmarking increased spending on highways by only 19 cents; when an extra dollar was earmarked for local government aid, spending for that purpose increased by 65 cents. These results suggest that state funds are quite fungible. Total spending and earmarked spending on education did not change.
5 Thus, when a new tax or tax increase is earmarked for education, the state reduces general fund support for education by an equal amount.
In general, empirical studies suggest that an earmarked tax does not necessarily lead to a spending increase in the favored sector: a full dollar of earmarking does not necessarily lead to a full dollar of spending. Because of fungibility between general funds and earmarked taxes, total spending does not necessarily increase with earmarking. A greater reliance on earmarking as a share of expenditures can result in either no change in spending or lower expenditures in practice.
Data and Research Methodology
Although some portion of SPLOST proceeds are used for individual municipal projects in a county, data analysis demonstrates that much of the proceeds are spent for countywide purposes (e.g., construction of county courthouses, jails, and administrative buildings) and capital projects in unincorporated parts of the county. To illustrate, 94 percent of total SPLOST proceeds were distributed to county governments, but only 6 percent went to municipalities in all 159 Georgia counties in FY 1997. Although there have been minor fluctuations, this trend has remained stable over time (Georgia Department of Community Affairs 1994) .
Although the impact of SPLOST on capital spending in cities can be investigated, several methodological and data problems suggest that a primary unit of analysis for study should be general-purpose county governments (notwithstanding the disparity in the distribution of SPLOST proceeds between counties and cities). First, although Georgia has over 530 municipalities, many of these cities are very small in size and deliver only a few limited services.
6 Hence, these municipalities' capital spending is minimal, and they seldom incur long-term debt, so comparing variations in the amount of capital spending across cities is problematic. Second, time-series data for socioeconomic variables for individual municipalities are difficult to obtain. Third, the revenue reliance and expenditure patterns vary between big cities and small cities, making it difficult to generalize findings across the state. There are large disparities between small and big counties as well as between urban and rural counties in revenues, expenditures, and demographic variables.
Due in part to intermittent use of SPLOST proceeds and fluctuating capital spending in many counties, assessing the effect of SPLOST on capital spending requires data that has been accumulated over a fairly long time period. The main fiscal data source for this research is the local government finance survey conducted annually since 1984 by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The data contain general-purpose local government financial information.
7 Since 1984, 136 counties have consistently submitted all 14 finance surveys and are therefore included in the analysis. As of FY 1990, their total general revenues and total expenditures amounted to 94 percent of the 158 county total and 95 percent of all capital spending by Georgia counties, a trend that has remained stable over time. The 136 counties are therefore considered to be representative of Georgia counties as a whole.
To control for inflation, all dollar variables are adjusted for inflation by using a GDP implicit price deflator (IPD) for state and local governments (1984 base year). The IPD, which is compiled by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis, is the best choice for most state and local government purchases of goods and services (Ammons 1990 (FY 1984) are pre-SPLOST, and 1,768 observations are from the post-SPLOST period. Several models of pooled regression are available, and the choice of the appropriate model is contingent on the results from diagnoses of the data error structure (Kmenta 1986; Sayers 1989; Baltagi 1995) .
A two-way fixed effects model is employed here to control for both unit-specific (county) and time-specific (year) effects in error terms by applying a fixed-effects estimator (Baltagi 1995) . In practice, the variables are entered as deviations from county and year means. Because the capital spending in counties is affected by both unobservable county-specific effects (e.g., county fiscal culture) and timespecific events (e.g., recessions and tax code changes), the model is expected to properly capture these variations.
Capital spending in the study is operationalized as the sum of purchase of equipment, land and structures, and construction. The Report of Local Government Finances has separate columns for these spending items, a classification that adequately represents local governments' capital spending. To measure the impact of SPLOST on capital spending, both level and share models are employed. Per capita capital spending is used to measure the level of capital spending, and capital spending as a percentage of total expenditure is used to capture capital spending as a share of total expenditure.
Among important attributes affecting variations in state and local governments' capital spending are capital spending needs, functional responsibility, competing operating spending needs, revenue availability, fiscal health, and political and institutional factors (Bunch 1988; Petersen 1968; Gramlich 1969; Pagano and Moore 1985; Kim 1987; Dye and McGuire 1992) . Depending on the available data set, variables representing these factors are employed in the model. Theoretically, capital spending needs in a community are largely dependent on variables such as population size, density, amount and degree of development, age of existing infrastructure, and composition of the industrial base (Kim 1987) . Variables such as population size, population change, percentage of homeowners, and per capita income represent capital spending needs. In general, positive associations with capital spending are expected for these variables. Because the number of functions that a government performs can also influence the spending level, this variable is also included. The number is calculated from the Report of Local Government Finances, which lists 33 functions that county governments perform. The percentage of population under 19 years of age is used to capture the competing operating spending needs (Bunch 1988) .
Revenue availability plays a significant role in decisions about capital spending. The availability of federal and state grants, additional revenue sources, earmarking of specific revenues for capital outlays, additional long-term debt, and other own-source revenues affect the level of capital spending (Gramlich 1969) . Own-source revenues (excluding SPLOST), federal and state grants, and outstanding general obligation and revenue debt are employed to measure revenue availability for capital spending. Similarly, the fiscal health of local government affects when and how much capital is spent. To reflect this trend, a fiscal health measure, the ratio of total general revenues (less total general expenditures) to total general expenditures, is employed in the analysis.
The literature also suggests that party affiliation of state legislatures and governors (Poterba 1987) and institutional factors such as the existence of constitutional debt limits, separate capital budgets, and the number of public authorities (Bunch 1988 ) may affect the level of capital spending in states. Since most of these political and institutional variables do not change over time, the fixed-effects model cannot employ these time-invariant variables (Baltagi 1995) . However, the unit dummy variable used in the model is expected to control unit-specific effects over time.
The empirical model employed in the study is represented as follows:
Capital spending level and share = f (population size, population change, income, population under 19, percent homeowners, function, SPLOST, own-source revenue other than SPLOST, state grants, federal grants, general obligation debt outstanding, revenue debt outstanding, fiscal health). Table 2 presents regression results of five models. As a primary independent variable, either SPLOSTDUM (dummy variable representing presence or absence of SPLOST use in counties) or SPLOST (per capita SPLOST collected) is employed. Much SPLOST revenue is spent by counties during the subsequent fiscal year or gradually, depending on the progress of SPLOST projects. Therefore, to account fully for the lagged effect of SPLOST money on other fiscal variables and spending, a lagged SPLOST dummy variable (SPLOSTDUM t-1 ) and dollar value (SPLOST t-1 ) are used in the analysis. The ) is used as a primary independent variable in the CAPTLEX (A) and PCTCAPTL models. Per capita SPLOST variable (SPLOST t-1 ) is employed in the remaining models. b F value tests the null hypothesis (no fixed effects). F value of all five models rejects the null hypothesis at the p < 0.01 level, which suggests that strong fixed effects are involved in the models. This interpretation justifies the use of a fixed-effects model.
Findings
on the per capita capital spending level, and the latter measures the effect of one dollar of SPLOST revenue on per capita capital spending in counties collecting the tax. The coefficient of SPLOSTDUM t-1 (20.98) in the CAPTLEX (A) model suggests that SPLOST-collecting counties spend an average of $21 more on per capita capital spending than do non-SPLOST counties. Given that the mean value of SPLOST is $22.40 (see Table 1 ), the results suggest that SPLOST is very powerful in increasing the level of local capital spending in counties that collect the tax. The coefficient of the SPLOST t-1 variable (0.51) in the CAPTLEX (B) model indicates that an extra dollar of SPLOST revenue results in an increase of 51 cents in capital spending per capita, which confirms the finding of other studies on earmarking that an extra dollar of earmarked revenue (SPLOST) does not result in a full dollar of spending in a designated category of spending. Nevertheless, the coefficient is relatively large compared with coefficients in other studies that examine earmarking at the state level (see Dye and McGuire 1992) . The remaining 49 cents of SPLOST money may be used either to reduce other sources of revenue (i.e., fungible sources) or to increase the level of current operating spending as seen in the positive coefficient of the SPLOST t-1 variable (0.21) in the CUREXPN model.
Unlike most previous studies (Dye and McGuire 1992; Spindler 1995; Borg and Mason 1988; Miller and Pierce 1997) , this study shows that earmarked revenue as a share of total expenditure is positive: the coefficient of the SPLOSTDUM t-1 variable (6.35) in the PCTCAPTL model-in which the dependent variable is percentage of capital spending as a percentage of total spending-indicates that counties maintain on average a 6.35 percent higher share of capital spending as a percentage of total spending in years in which SPLOST revenue is collected. 8 Given that the mean value of capital spending as a percentage of total expenditure is 15.5 percent over time (see Table 1 ), 6.35 percent is quite impressive. Thus, the use of earmarked revenue significantly increases both the level and share of capital spending in Georgia counties.
The coefficient of SPLOST t-1 (0.72) in the TLEXPN model (in which the dependent variable is per capita total spending) suggests that an extra dollar of SPLOST revenue brings an average of 72 cents (per capita) in total spending. Likewise, a dollar of SPLOST revenue results in 51 cents in capital spending (CAPTLEX (B)) and 21 cents in current operating spending (CUREXPN). Thus, this study shows that local earmarking can significantly increase the size of total spending, not to mention the size of spending in the earmarked sector-even though, as noted earlier, an extra dollar of earmarked revenue does not bring a full dollar increase in total spending. Rather, total spending is increased by 72 cents, with the remaining 28 cents used to reduce other tax and nontax revenue sources.
The coefficients of STATEAID (0.53), in both the CAPTLEX (A) and CAPTLEX (B) models, suggest that state grants can be one of the most effective instruments in increasing the level of local capital spending in Georgia counties. In part, this increase can be attributed to the project-specific, categorical nature of most state grants, some of which have matching requirements for local governments. 9 Next to state grants, SPLOST (51 cents) and federal grants (39 cents) provide the largest increases (see CAPTLEX (B) column). Although statistically significant, outstanding long-term general obligation and revenue debt seem to be less powerful than either intergovernmental grants or SPLOST in increasing the level of capital spending in counties, as the low coefficients of the GO-OUTSTG and REVOTG variables in the CAPTLEX (A) and CAPTLEX (B) models indicate.
Summary and Implications of Findings
This study finds that counties that use SPLOST on average spend $21 more on per capita capital expenditure than do non-SPLOST counties. An extra dollar of SPLOST results in an increase of per capita capital spending of 51 cents. Moreover, SPLOST counties have higher capital spending as a percentage of total spending than do non-SPLOST counties (by an average of 6.4 percent). An extra dollar of SPLOST revenue results in an average per capita increase of 21 cents in current operating spending. Thus, the findings in Georgia counties demonstrate that local earmarking can significantly increase both the level and share of a designated category of spending. As other studies have found, an extra dollar of an earmarked revenue source does not result in a full dollar of spending in the designated sector; however, the magnitude of the effect of local earmarking seems to be larger than at the state level. Total spending also increases significantly with local earmarking; that is, although part of the earmarked revenue can be diverted to substitute for other (fungible) revenue sources, the degree of diversion (or fungibility) at the local level may be relatively less than at the state level. With relatively large revenue sources, state legislators may have more options for diverting funds, but complicated revenue sources make it difficult to tie a specific revenue source to a designated category of spending. In a local setting, however, where there is a relatively small budget and simple revenue structures, local elected officials are less able to divert revenue sources between general funds and special funds (i.e., earmarked funds). The earmarked revenue sources are therefore more conspicuous in local budgets than in a state budget.
Considering previous studies of state-level spending, this study suggests that local earmarking may be more effective than state earmarking in increasing the level and share of designated spending. Other states aspiring to increase the level of their local capital spending can learn from Georgia, a state that has effectively implemented a form of taxation to enable its localities to finance their capital projects. This form of taxation may be especially viable in states in which taxpayers are unwilling to accept hikes in property taxes or general obligation bond issues for local capital projects.
This study sheds some light on the impact of local earmarking on designated category spending. Further empirical studies of other categories of local earmarking are warranted to generalize the findings. It would be equally important to research the effect of earmarking on the level and share of designated spending between different levels of government. 
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Notes
1. Georgia's SPLOST is unique in that it requires a referendum passage to adopt the tax, and the proceeds of the tax are earmarked for a limited set of local capital projects approved by voters. ACIR (1995, (100) (101) reports that local governments in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, and Wyoming use local sales taxes to finance local capital projects. However, almost nothing is known about the administration and implementation of such local sales taxes in these states, not to mention their effects on the level of capital spending. 2. Although studies by public choice school theorists have shown that earmarking can result in increased government efficiency by closely linking tax payments to benefits (similar to user charges), their models are ambiguous in predicting the effect of earmarking. Earmarking may result in lower expenditures in models where the earmarking mechanism acts as a constraint on the budget-maximizing bureaucrat. In other models, earmarking may facilitate a form of logrolling and thus may lead to higher levels of spending. See Buchanan 1963; Deran 1965; Eklund 1972. 3 . SPLOST is collected by the Georgia Department of Revenue and disbursed to the county after 1 percent of the tax proceeds is paid to the state treasury to defray the cost of administration. 4. In 1975, the Georgia General Assembly decided that local governments could impose a 1 percent LOST. The tax is intended to provide property tax relief and additional revenue to local governments. As with SPLOST, referendum passage is required. Unlike SPLOST, LOST can only be repealed in another referendum. Since the inception of LOST, the number of counties collecting the tax has grown rapidly; as of January 2000, all Georgia counties except six were collecting the tax. For detailed information about the LOST and its effect on property tax reduction, see Jung 2001. 5. Regression results showed that the coefficient of the variable representing the impact of total earmarked revenue on total spending was -0.03, as was the coefficient for elementary and secondary education. However, these coefficients were not statistically significant. 6. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Georgia had 533 cities in 1994. Of these, 464 cities (87 percent) had populations of less than 5,000; 155 cities had populations of less than 500. Only 54 cities (10 percent) had populations that were over 10,000. 7. Georgia's three consolidated city-county governments (Columbus-Muscogee County, Athens-Clarke County, Augusta-Richmond County) are included as counties in this analysis because they submitted data for the Report of Local Government Finances using county forms and are usually classified as county governments for other statistical purposes.
When the per capita SPLOST variable (SPLOST)
is employed as a primary variable instead of the SPLOST dummy variable, the coefficient of the variable (0.14) is statistically significant. Thus, an extra dollar of SPLOST revenue results in a 0.14 percent increase in capital spending as a percentage of total spending. 9. Public finance theory suggests that categorical state grants with a matching requirement by the recipient local government can increase spending in the designated category most effectively. This phenomenon is referred to as the "flypaper effect."
